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Abstract 
From an economic point of view, legal considerations apart, tax avoidance, tax 
evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of revenue yields, and 
are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden. Due to legal differences and 
moral concerns it is, however, likely that individuals perceive them as different and as 
unequally fair.  
Overall, 252 fiscal officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs 
produced spontaneous associations to a scenario either describing tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, or tax flight, and evaluated them as positive, neutral or negative. 
The results indicate that everyday representations differ with respect to tax avoidance, 
tax evasion, and tax flight. Tax evasion was perceived rather negatively, tax flight 
neutrally, and tax avoidance positively. Although fiscal officers judged all forms of 
tax reduction least fair, all sub-samples found tax evasion less fair than tax avoidance 
or tax flight. With regard to knowledge of tax law and fairness perception, differential 
effects were found: Business lawyers and entrepreneurs judged tax avoidance the 
fairer the higher their knowledge was. Fiscal officers, on the other hand, found tax 
evasion especially unfair if their knowledge was high.  
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1. Introduction 
From a macro-economic perspective – legal considerations apart - tax avoidance, tax evasion, 
and tax flight have similar negative effects on the national budget. Hence, economists suggest 
to analyze their effects jointly, and no longer discriminate between them (e.g., Cross and 
Shaw, 1982). However, from a psychological perspective, due to legal differences and moral 
considerations (Etzioni, 1988), it is assumed that taxpayers perceive tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight differently, despite their identical economic consequences.  
In this paper we contrast the two research positions by investigating social representations of 
tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight. Social representations (Moscovici, 1981; 1984) 
allow a direct comparison of economic and psychological predictions on the same data level. 
Since the economic line of reasoning focuses on the macro-perspective, we cannot study 
individual opinions or attitudes but rather their socially embedded equivalents, the so-called 
social representations.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1.1 definitions of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and 
tax flight are provided as well as empirical research is discussed. Section 1.2 deals with the 
concept of social representations, and in section 1.3 our hypotheses are introduced. Section 2 
deals with the research method, particularly with the participants, design, material, and 
procedure. In section 3 our results are presented and discussed, particularly focussing on the 
central core of social representations, their semantic contents, attitudes towards tax avoidance, 
tax evasion, and tax flight, their perceived fairness, tax knowledge, as well as individual tax 
compliance within the context of employment group. A conclusion is presented in section 4. 
 
1.1 Tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
Tax avoidance refers to an attempt to reduce tax payments by legal means, for instance by 
exploiting tax-loopholes, whereas tax evasion refers to an illegal reduction of tax payments, 
for instance by underreporting income or by stating higher deduction-rates.1 Tax flight refers 
to the relocation of businesses, only in order to save taxes, for instance by making use of 
offshore tax havens.  
Since tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight have similar effects, economists suggest not to 
differentiate between them but to analyze their effects jointly (Cross and Shaw, 1982). 
However, this line of argumentation – solely focussing on analytical research methods – takes 
not into account results of empirical evidence on actual tax behavior. The prescriptive power 
of analytical models of tax evasion (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), mainly focussing on 
exogenous variables like audit-frequency and sanction, lack conclusive empirical evidence 
(Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1999; Baldry, 1987; Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Cullis and 
Lewis, 1997; Kaplan and Reckers, 1985; Webley, Robben, Elffers and Hessing, 1991). Thus, 
monetary consequences alone seem not sufficient to reliably predict and describe actual tax 
behavior. However, in formal economic models individuals are considered to solely passively 
react to exogenous variables, and to pay taxes only because they fear audits and sanctions. 
Intrinsic motives, such as perceived fairness, cooperation or social norms, remain un-
considered. 
In most countries, however, audit-frequencies are remarkable low and sanctions mostly imply 
just the payment of unpaid taxes and only a minor fine, indicating that a purely economic 
                                                 
1 In reality however there are many gray areas that do not permit an easy differentiation between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).   
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analysis of tax evasion is insufficient. If individuals consider tax payments as a gamble, solely 
specified by exogenous variables, the best choice would be to evade (Alm, McClelland and 
Schulze, 1992). Yet, in reality compliance rates were found to be higher than predicted from a 
purely economic viewpoint. Thus, it can be assumed that in addition to exogenous variables 
also intrinsic variables, such as perceived fairness, cooperation or social norms, are of 
fundamental importance in tax decisions. 
A substantial body of literature confirms the importance of psychological factors on the 
decision-outcome with respect to tax evasion, like framing effects (e.g., Chang, Nichols and 
Schultz, 1987; Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2001; Robben, Webley Elffers and Hessing, 1990; 
Schepanski and Shearer, 1995), perceived justice and fairness (e.g., Dornstein, 1987; Kirchler, 
1997; Spicer and Becker, 1980; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976), the importance of attitudinal 
aspects (e.g., Kirchler, 1999; Lewis, 1979; Vogel, 1974), the role of opportunity (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 1983; Groenland and van Veldhoven, 1983; Porcano, 1988; Wärneryd and 
Walerud, 1982; Wallschutzky, 1984; Weigel, Hessing and Elffers, 1987), etc. There are also 
other studies focussing on legal tax avoidance, indicating that respondents believe that the 
"ordinary people" have to bear most of the tax burden (Kinsey, 1984) and that they wish to 
reduce tax-loopholes (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). However, while there is a large number of 
studies available either focussing on tax avoidance or on tax evasion, hardly any studies have 
been concerned with the differentiation of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
1.2 Social representations 
Everyday representations are the central topic of social representations theory. Social 
representations are defined as socially shared ideas, opinions, and attitudes (Moscovici, 1981; 
1984). They are a broadly defined concept, capturing social reality, and having similarity with 
myths, beliefs, and ideologies. Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) extend the concept of social 
representations by defining them as "common-sense" theories. Thus, instead of focussing on 
individual attitudes and opinions, everyday-knowledge becomes the center of research 
interest.  
Socially shared knowledge, concepts, and beliefs which are generated in a social net comprise 
psychological as well as sociological factors. The production and the function of social 
representations are closely related to one another. Social representations serve as means to 
establish coherence within groups and to allow a distinction between groups. 
Social representations are frequently not investigated by questionnaires, structured interviews 
or experiments, but rather by methods allowing respondents to reply freely, for instance by 
producing spontaneous associations to a stimulus object. 
Especially French psychologists developed theory and method. When free associations are 
produced to one or more stimulus objects, often frequencies of associations to stimuli are 
analyzed by correspondence analyses which produce a cognitive and evaluative map or space 
of associations and stimuli and to allow to detect typical characteristics of the stimuli and 
differentiations between them. Vergès (1987) distinguishes between three aspects of social 
representations: (i) relevant attitudes, opinions and evaluations towards an object, (ii) 
available information and knowledge about an object, and (iii) the structure of emotional, 
cognitive, and motivational factors associated with an object. Abric (1996) distinguishes 
between the central core and the peripheral system of social representations. The central core 
is defined as a stable, un-negotiable, and non-transformable part of the representations, 
whereas the peripheral system accounts for inter-individual differences with respect to a 
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stimulus object. Vergés and Bastounis (2001) describe the analysis of the central core and 
periphery of a representation by the method of evocation. This method requires participants to 
spontaneously produce associations to a stimulus. The examination of data starts by a 
lexicographical term analysis in which neither associations nor synonyms are categorized in 
one group of associations. First frequencies of associations are counted and the mean rank in 
the production series is calculated. Second, frequently and at the beginning of the association 
task mentioned terms are grouped, indicating the elements of the nucleus of a representation. 
Terms mentioned either less frequently but at the beginning of the association task and terms 
mentioned with high frequency but toward the end indicate the first periphery, and those 
terms mentioned with low frequency and late in the task indicate the second periphery. 
 
1.3 Hypotheses 
Empirical evidence indicates that formal economic models of tax behavior lack conclusive 
empirical evidence. The deterrent effects of economic determinants, such as audit-frequency 
and sanction, were found not to be sufficient in order to fully describe and explain individual 
tax behavior. Moreover, in addition to economic determinants of tax decisions also 
psychological factors, such as perceived fairness, cooperation or social norms, were found to 
be important in describing and understanding tax behavior.   
Thus, despite the fact that from an economic viewpoint, legal considerations apart, tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight have similar effects on the national budget and are 
based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden, we hypothesize from a psychological 
viewpoint that taxpayers discriminate between them, and evaluate tax avoidance, tax evasion, 
and tax flight differently. According to the macro-perspective of the economic line of 
reasoning, social representations are investigated in order to contrast predictions of economics 
and psychology on the same data level.  
Hypothesis 1: An analysis of social representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax 
flight allows for a clear distinction between the concepts, indicating that tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight are perceived socially differently, despite their identical reductions of 
revenue yields. 
Moreover, we do not only expect that tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight are clearly 
discriminated from one another, but that they are also perceived as unequally fair by the 
taxpayers. Since tax avoidance is a legal means to reduce one’s tax burden, whereas tax 
evasion involves a criminal and illegal offence, we hypothesize that the former is perceived as 
fairer than the latter. Tax flight, however, defined as the relocation of businesses, only in 
order to save taxes, is less unambiguous. While tax flight is clearly no criminal offence, it still 
seems immoral, since individuals involved in tax flight only intend to reduce their tax burden. 
Thus, we hypothesize that tax flight is perceived as less fair than legal tax avoidance, but at 
the same time as fairer than illegal tax evasion. 
Hypothesis 2: Tax avoidance is expected to be evaluated fairer than tax flight which in turn is 
expected to be evaluated fairer than tax evasion. 
Empirical evidence indicates that tax knowledge is correlated with tax compliance. Groenland 
and van Veldhoven (1983) report that profound tax knowledge implies low tax compliance, 
whereas the results of a study by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) imply the opposite to be 
true, little tax knowledge was associated with low tax compliance. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
show that following an increase in tax knowledge, respondents consider their own tax evasion 
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as more serious, the perceived fairness in taxation increased, and attitudes towards other 
people’s tax evasion became stricter.  
Since Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) report that little tax knowledge is associated with low 
tax compliance, one plausible explanation could be that tax knowledge is positively correlated 
with attitudes towards legal tax avoidance and at the same time negatively correlated with 
attitudes towards illegal tax evasion. Thus, profound tax knowledge is assumed to lead one to 
perceive tax avoidance more positively than tax evasion, whereas little tax knowledge is 
assumed to imply the opposite, namely to perceive tax evasion more positively than tax 
avoidance. 
Hypothesis 3:  Tax knowledge is positively correlated with attitudes towards legal tax 
avoidance and negatively correlated with attitudes towards illegal tax evasion. 
Empirical evidence also shows that the opportunity to evade taxes influences individual tax 
compliance (e.g., Porcano, 1988; Wärneryd and Walerud, 1982; Wallschutzky, 1984; Weigel, 
Hessing and Elffers, 1987). Since in most industrialized countries, taxes for the employed are 
usually withheld from their salaries and wages, whereas self-employed and entrepreneurs pay 
taxes out of their pocket, based on their own information provided, we hypothesize that the 
latter show less compliance than the former. Clotfelter (1983) analyzed a sample of 47,000 
individual tax returns for the year 1969 and found that underreporting varies with respect to 
employment group, and Groenland and van Veldhoven (1983) report that experience with 
black money varies between employed and unemployed. Thus, with respect to opportunity we 
hypothesize that individual tax compliance in our study is lower for the group of business 
entrepreneurs than for the employed groups of business lawyers and fiscal officers. Since 
business students do not have a regular income from work, they are not considered in our 
analysis. 
Hypothesis 4: Individual tax compliance is lower for business entrepreneurs than for business 
lawyers and fiscal officers. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants and design 
Overall, 252 fiscal officers, students of economics and business administration specializing in 
auditing and accounting, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs participated in the study. A 
detailed description of the sub-samples is provided in Table 1. 
The study was conducted as a 3 x 4 factorial design. Independent variables were (i) a fictive 
scenario of a person engaged in tax avoidance, tax evasion, or tax flight, and (ii) respondents’ 
employment groups (tax officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs). It 
should be emphasized that the terms tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight were never 
used in the scenarios explicitly. Both experimental factors were between-subjects factors, and 
participants were randomly presented one of the three scenarios. The assignment of 
employment groups to scenario conditions is shown in Table 2. 
 
2.2 Material and procedure 
Participants read one of the three scenarios (see Figure 1), produced spontaneous associations 
to it, and evaluated them as positive, neutral or negative. Before starting the associative task, 
participants were asked to answer a control question about the scenario for a manipulation 
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check. Overall, ten participants failed to respond correctly. Their data were excluded from the 
analyses. In addition to the associations, participants were asked to judge perceived fairness 
of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight (scale ranging from 1 = unfair to 9 = fair), and to 
respond to a multiple-choice test on tax knowledge (see Appendix B). Those participants 
confronted with the scenario describing a person engaged in tax evasion were also asked to 
state how much they think the person described in the scenario would honestly declare to the 
tax authorities. 
Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 





N 75 82 56 39 252 
Sex      
Female 34 40 17 8 99 
Male 32 40 39 29 140 
Missing values 9 2 0 2 13 
Age      
M 28.84 26.13 33.43 45.74 31.62 
SD 7.06 6.86 6.17 12.50 10.28 
Missing values 19 2 0 4 25 
Formal education      
Compulsory school 0 0 0 16 16 
Secondary school 45 74 0 12 131 
College/university 23 6 56 8 93 
Missing values 7 2 0 3 12 
Net monthly income in 
Austrian Shillings 
     
< 10,000 0 55 0 4 59 
10,001 – 20,000 51 9 4 9 73 
20,001 – 30,000 11 5 13 6 35 
30,001 – 40,000 1 2 11 15 29 
> 40,000 0 0 26 0 26 
Missing values 12 11 2 5 30 
Note: 100 Austrian Shillings equal 7.27 Euro or  6.92 US$ (June, 2000)  
 
Table 2: Participants by experimental condition 
 Scenario   







Fiscal officers 21 21 33 3 75 
Business students 27 28 27 5 82 
Business lawyers 19 16 21 0 56 
Entrepreneurs 13 15 11 2 39 
Total 80 80 92 10 252 
 
Fiscal officers were approached during a further education program; students at lectures at the 
university; business lawyers were contacted through large law agencies; and entrepreneurs 
were contacted in their firms and stores. Responding to the questionnaire took approximately 
25 minutes. 
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Figure 1: Scenario about tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
Please, put yourself in the situation described below: 
 
Mr. Paul K. is owner of a successful travel agency. 
 
Last month he has earned an extra income in the amount of 75,000 Austrian Shillings for organizing a special 
event. 
 
Mr. Paul K. considers to make use of legal tax loopholes in order to reduce his tax payments. 
(Mr. Paul K. considers not to declare his extra income in his income declaration.) 
[Mr. Paul K. considers to relocate his headquarters to another country in order to reduce the tax burden in the 
future.] 
 
Note:  The expression in the third paragraph without parentheses describes tax avoidance, the expression in 
parentheses describes tax evasion, whereas the expression in brackets describes tax flight.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
In the following, free associations of four employment groups on tax avoidance, tax evasion, 
and tax flight were analyzed, (i) for detection of a possible central core and the peripheral 
system of social representations, and (ii) for semantic contents. Moreover, (iii) attitudes 
towards tax behavior and (iv) fairness judgments were investigated, (v) tax knowledge, as 
well as (vi) individual tax compliance within the context of employment group. 
 
3.1 Central core of social representations towards tax behavior 
Participants were asked to produce spontaneous associations to the scenario in the 
questionnaire. Overall, 880 associations were produced, 507 of them were different. In the 
condition with the scenario on tax avoidance, 261 associations were counted of which 156 
were different. In the condition on tax evasion, 309 associations were generated of which 182 
were different, and in the condition on tax flight, participants produced 310 different 
associations of which 169 were different.  
Table 3: Most likely core elements of the associations on tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
Tax avoidance Tax evasion Tax flight 
Associations f M Associations f M Associations f M 
Legal 15 2.33 Illegal 12 2.08 Tax saving 10 1.40
Tax saving 8 1.63 Fraud 7 1.86 Lower taxes abroad 9 3.40
Clever 8 3.00 Income declaration 7 3.29 Double tax agreement 5 3.20
Good idea 5 1.60 Criminal prosecution 6 2.00    
Costs 5 2.60 Risk 5 2.80    
   Tax-audit 5 3.60    
   Black money 5 5.00    
Note: The columns f refer to the absolute frequency of associations, and the columns M display the mean of the 
positions of the associations.  
Table 3 displays the frequencies of associations and the mean rank in the series of production 
(terms mentioned by less than five participants are not included). Only those associations 
were analyzed which were not literal repetitions of what was written in the scenarios. The 
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most likely core elements of the associations on tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight are 
those mentioned frequently and at the beginning of the associative task. Since no significant 
differences between the sub-samples were found, the total sample was analyzed. 
Tax avoidance was associated with legal, with an intention to save taxes, with cleverness and 
a good idea as well as with costs. Tax evasion, on the other hand, was associated with illegal, 
fraud, criminal prosecution, risk, tax-audit, punishable, penalty, and the risk of getting caught. 
Also, rather neutral associations like income declaration and tax saving as well as black 
money were produced. Tax flight was associated with an intention to save taxes, with an 
impression that taxes are substantially lower abroad as well as with double tax agreement and 
costs of relocation. 
Participants clearly distinguished between tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight in their 
spontaneously produced associations as expected under hypothesis 1. The most likely core 
elements of tax avoidance refer to legality and cleverness, whereas tax evasion was 
considered to be illegal, a criminal offence, and as being risky. Eventually, tax flight was 
associated with the lower perceived tax burden abroad and with an intention to save taxes, but 
also with associated costs of relocating and with the restriction of double tax agreements. 
Interestingly, tax saving was considered to be a motive for all three tax-reduction possibilities, 
namely for tax avoidance, tax evasion, and for tax flight. However, they differ with respect to 
the perceived importance of that motive. Tax saving was highly considered to be a central 
motive for tax flight and tax avoidance, but was only mentioned relatively late in the 
association process for tax evasion, indicating that the wish to save taxes is overlaid by 
thoughts of illegality, risk, or by criminal prosecution.   
 
3.2 Semantic content of social representations towards tax behavior 
In a further step of analysis, the 507 different associations were regrouped in categories of 
synonyms. First, four experts developed a category scheme according to the associations. 
Overall, 35 semantic categories plus an additional category for those associations that do not 
fit in the regular scheme were developed. Then, three further experts were explained the 
categories and instructed to categorize independently all different associations into the 36 
categories. In case of disagreement the experts had to further discuss until an agreement was 
reached. Table 4 (in the Appendix A) shows the categories and the respective characteristic 
associations as well as frequencies of associations by experimental conditions. The categories 
"literal repetition of the scenario" as well as the "rest"-category were not included in the 
analysis.2 
A correspondence analysis on frequencies displayed in Table 4 yielded two dimensions which 
explained 31% and 23% of the variance. The two dimensions divide the data according to (i) 
legality and (ii) to morality. Figure 2 (also in the Appendix A) indicates that the produced 
associations on tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight are clearly differentiated from one 
another as indicated by the corresponding clusters, irrespective of the employment group. 
Tax avoidance was perceived as legal and as moral, tax evasion as illegal and immoral, and 
finally tax flight as legal and as immoral. More precisely, tax avoidance was associated with 
the acceptance of tax reduction, the make use of tax allowances, legal tax reduction, 
horizontal justice, and with tax loophole. Tax evasion was associated with risk tendency, 
peccadillo, intentional evasion, audit and sanction, opportunity, black money, unacceptance, 
                                                 
2 An additional correspondence analysis was run with all 36 categories leading to similar results. 
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unintentional errors, and with vertical justice. Hence, tax evasion again is basically associated 
with shadow economy and is considered as a criminal offence.3 Tax flight was associated 
with tax havens, negative consequences of tax flight, with flight abroad, bureaucracy, 
economic advantages of tax flight, economic consequences, with unprofitable, with criticism 
on the tax system, and with the wish to reduce the tax burden. It might be interesting to note 
that sanctions and audits – determinants of evasion considered in economic models – were 
associated with tax evasion. However, also vertical justice and opportunity to evade were 
typical associations. Opportunity and justice considerations are frequently studied variables in 
psychological investigations (e.g., Dornstein, 1987; Kirchler, 1997; Spicer and Becker, 1980; 
Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976). While vertical justice proved to be relevant with tax evasion, 
horizontal justice was associated with tax avoidance. Also reactance and injustice in general 
were related to tax avoidance. Tax flight, on the other hand, seems to be considered if 
bureaucray is increasing. 
 
3.3 Attitudes towards tax behavior 
Participants were asked to evaluate their spontaneously produced associations. According to 
these responses attitudinal indices were computed (de Rosa, 1996). The polarity index results 
from the difference between the number of positive and negative associations, related to the 
total number of associations produced by a participant. It ranges from -1 (negative attitude) to 
+1 (positive attitude). The neutrality index is calculated as the relative frequency of neutral 
associations related to the total number of associations. It varies from 0 to 1.  
Two 3 by 4 analyses of variance with scenario and employment groups as independent 
variables and polarity index as well as neutrality index as dependent variables yielded the 
following results: For the polarity index, only the scenario was significant (F(2; 208) = 5.22; p 
< .001), indicating that independent of employment group (F(3; 208) = 0.95, p = .42), 
participants produced most negative associations in the condition of tax evasion (M = -.26; 
SD = .48); rather neutral associations in the tax flight condition (M = .11; SD = .56) and 
relatively positive associations in the tax avoidance condition (M = .29; SD = .52), as 
                                                 
3 In a study about "Individual behaviour in the shadow economy in Australia" Schneider, Braithwaite and 
Reinhart (2001) investigated how individuals act with respect to be engaged in shadow economy activities which 
is always linked with tax evasion. In this study a detailed investigation is made, what are the reasons, why people 
work in the shadow economy, how they react to a rising tax burden and how they evaluate the risks of being 
"caught" by the tax authorities. As this is all closely linked with the results of this paper some of the results are 
briefly reported here. Not astonishing is that those who are engaged in shadow economy activities to a much 
larger degree, argue that income taxes are too high and that they should less honestly declare all cash earnings 
(significant result in a logistic regression with a dependent variable, people working in the shadow economy = 0, 
people not working in the shadow economy = 1). Also those who work in the shadow economy think that the 
changes are small, that they will be caught by the tax authorities, compared to those, who do not work in the 
shadow economy. Moreover those who work in the shadow economy think it is smart to do so, because they can 
get additional income and are unsatisfied with the amount of goods and services, the state authorities provide 
them. To provide a few more detailed results, 33% of those who work in the shadow economy (either demand or 
supply it), think, that the chances that you will get caught by the tax authorities are about 0, compared to 15% of 
those who do not work in the shadow economy. Those who think it is almost certain that they will be caught by 
the tax authorities when working in the shadow economy are 9.6%, compared to 22.3% of those who are not 
working in the shadow economy. 37.7% of those, who work in the shadow economy, think, that the income 
taxes are too high, compared to 19.4% who are not working in the shadow economy. These results point out 
some similarities to the results found in this paper, so that a general conclusion may be that those who evade 
taxes believe to a higher extend that taxes and that the tax burden is too high, the risk of being caught is less 
likely, compared to those, who do not evade taxes (do not work in the shadow economy). 
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expected under hypothesis 2. Thus, our results indicate that participants not only 
discriminated in their spontaneously produced associations between tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight, but that they also perceived them as unequally fair and evaluated them 
differently. As expected, tax avoidance was perceived rather positively, tax flight rather 
neutrally, and tax evasion rather negatively. 
With regard to the neutrality index, the analysis of variance revealed a main effect for 
employment group (F(3; 208) = 5.60; p < .01), whereas the scenario had no influence (F(2; 
208) = 1.23, p = .29) on the evaluation of spontaneously produced associations. Fiscal officers 
(M = .35; SD = .29) and entrepreneurs (M = .31; SD = .32) produced the least neutral 
associations, followed by business lawyers (M = .24; SD = .27). And finally, business 
students produced rather neutral associations (M = .17; SD = .23). These results can be 
interpreted in terms of personal affectedness and experience. The only group with no or little 
experience with taxes is the group of business students. The group of business lawyers are 
mainly indirectly affected by taxes due to their task of advising clients in tax matters. Thus, 
not surprisingly these employment groups produced rather neutral associations to the tax 
scenarios. To the contrary, entrepreneurs and fiscal officers are more directly affected by tax 
matters: Entrepreneurs have to pay them out of their pockets, and fiscal officers have to 
collect them. Correspondingly, both employment groups are not only affected by taxes, but 
are also emotionally involved. Therefore, it is not surprising that both employment groups, 
entrepreneurs and fiscal officers, produced the least neutral associations.  
 
3.4 Subjective fairness of tax behavior  
Participants in all experimental conditions were asked to answer three items on subjective 
fairness of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight on a nine-step scale, ranging from 1 = 
unfair to 9 = fair. We hypothesized that despite the fact that tax avoidance, tax evasion, and 
tax flight lead to identical economic consequences, they are not perceived as equally fair by 
taxpayers. It was expected that tax avoidance is evaluated fairer than tax flight which in turn 
is evaluated fairer than tax evasion. 
A repeated analysis of variance with tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight as repeated 
factor and employment group as independent factor indicates significant differences between 
the sample (F(3; 243) = 9.18, p < .001). Fiscal officers found all forms of tax reduction less 
fair than business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs. These results may reflect the 
high moral standards of fiscal officers, leading them to generally evaluate all forms of tax 
reduction more negatively than others.  
In all employment groups tax avoidance was considered to be fairest (M = 8.17; SD = 1.84), 
whereas tax evasion was considered to be least fair (M = 2.92; SD = 2.27). Subjective fairness 
of tax flight was rated in between tax avoidance and tax evasion (M = 6.34; SD = 2.79), as 
expected under hypothesis 2. Figure 3 indicates that fiscal officers generally perceived all 
three tax-reduction possibilities to be less fair, whereas entrepreneurs considered tax flight to 
be fairer in comparison to others, outlining that entrepreneurs are the only employment group 






Figure 3: Perceived fairness of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight with respect to employment group 
 
3.5 Attitudes and perceived fairness within the context of tax knowledge 
Overall, participants were asked to answer 10 multiple-choice questions on tax knowledge 
(see Appendix B; Cronbach α = .62). In each question they had to choose the correct answer 
out of four possible ones. An index was computed out of the ten questions, ranging from 0 = 
no correct answers to 1 = all questions correctly answered.  
An analysis of variance with tax knowledge as dependent factor and employment group as 
independent factor yields significant differences between the sample with respect to 
knowledge (F(3; 238) = 74.88, p < .001). Fiscal officers scored highest (MF  = .94, SDF = .08), 
followed by business students (MS = .88, SDS = .12), and business lawyers (ML = .80, SDL = 
.20). Entrepreneurs, on the contrary, achieved the poorest results (ME = .51, SDE = .18), may 
be because they rely on professional advice when tax issues are concerned.  
With respect to hypothesis 3, it was investigated whether tax knowledge is positively 
correlated with attitudes towards tax avoidance and negatively correlated with attitudes 
towards tax evasion. Our results, however, do not confirm this conjecture. Considering the 
whole sample, tax knowledge is neither correlated with the perceived fairness of tax evasion 
(r(238) = -.06, p = .33), nor with the perceived fairness of tax avoidance (r(242) = -.02, p = 
.80). However, for the sub-sample of business lawyers and entrepreneurs it was shown that 
profound tax knowledge is positively correlated with perceived fairness of tax avoidance 
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was tax avoidance perceived. For the sub-sample of fiscal officers, on the other hand, it could 
be shown that tax knowledge is negatively correlated with perceived fairness of tax evasion 
(r(70) = -.24, p < .05), indicating that the lower the knowledge about taxes the fairer illegal 
evasion was judged. 
 
3.6 Individual tax compliance within the context of employment group 
Participants assigned to the experimental condition "tax evasion" were asked to state how 
much they think the person described in the scenario would honestly declare to the tax 
authorities. In line with previous empirical evidence, we hypothesized that opportunity 
influences individual tax compliance. More precisely, it was expected that individual tax 
compliance would be lower for the group of business entrepreneurs than for the employed 
groups of business lawyers and fiscal officers. Since business students do not have a regular 
income from work, they are not considered in the subsequent analysis. 
An analysis of variance with individual tax compliance as dependent factor and employment 
group as independent factor yields no significant differences between the sample (F(1; 42) = 
0.02, p = .96). The relative frequency of declared income was not statistically significantly 
lower for the group of business entrepreneurs (M = .24, SD = .27) compared to the group of 
business lawyers and fiscal officers (M = .24, SD = .39). Thus, our results do not confirm the 
role of opportunity with respect to individual tax compliance, we therefore cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis, indicating that individual tax compliance is the same for business entre-
preneurs as well as for business lawyers and fiscal officers. However, in line with previous 
empirical studies showing that income is negatively correlated with individual tax compliance 
(e.g., Anderhub, Giese, Güth, Hoffmann and Otto, 1999; Maciejovsky, Kirchler and 
Schwarzenberger, 2001), we found – at least for the group of business entrepreneurs – that a 
higher income is connected to a low tax compliance (r(31) = - .39, p < .05). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The results show that despite the similar effects of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
on revenue yields, 252 fiscal officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs 
clearly discriminated in their spontaneously produced associations between them. Tax 
avoidance was perceived as legal and as moral, and was amongst others associated with 
intention to save taxes, with cleverness and with a good idea. Tax evasion, on the other hand, 
was perceived as illegal and immoral, and was, for instance, associated with fraud, criminal 
prosecution, risk, tax-audit, and with penalty. Finally, tax flight was perceived as legal and as 
immoral, and was amongst others associated with intention to save taxes, with an impression 
that taxes are lower abroad and with costs of relocating. 
The results also indicate that taxpayers not only discriminate between tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight, but also perceive them as unequally fair. Tax avoidance was more 
positively evaluated than tax flight and than tax evasion, which was least positively evaluated. 
These results were found to hold irrespective of employment group. However, fiscal officers 
perceived all three forms of tax reduction to be less fair, whereas entrepreneurs considered tax 
flight to be fairer in comparison to others. In addition, the results indicate that for business 
lawyers and for entrepreneurs profound tax knowledge is positively correlated with perceived 
fairness of tax avoidance, indicating that the better one’s knowledge about tax law the fairer 
one perceives legal tax avoidance. To the contrary, the results show that for fiscal officers tax 
knowledge was found to be negatively correlated with perceived fairness of tax evasion, 
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indicating that the lower the knowledge about taxes the fairer illegal evasion was perceived. 
Furthermore, our results could not confirm the role of opportunity in individual tax 
compliance, indicating that business entrepreneurs were not less compliant than business 
lawyers and fiscal officers. However, in line with previous empirical studies it was found that 
income is negatively correlated with tax compliance. 
In conclusion, our results indicate that lay concepts about taxes, more precisely about tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight, seem to be determined not only by economic aspects 
but also by moral considerations (Etzioni, 1988). It could be shown that despite the fact that 
tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight lead to similar effects on revenue yields, taxpayers 
discriminate between them and evaluate them differently. Moreover, it could be shown that 
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Appendix A:    Table 4: Frequencies of categorized associations by employment group and scenario 
  Fiscal officers Business students Business lawyers Entrepreneurs 
No. Category Tax Tax Tax Tax 
  Avoidance Evasion Flight Avoidance Evasion Flight Avoidance Evasion Flight Avoidance Evasion Flight 
1 Intentional tax evasion 3 11 2 3 12 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 
2 Tax evasion based on errors 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
3 Intransparency of the tax system 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
4 Tax havens 1 0 6 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
5 Legal tax reduction 5 0 2 6 5 8 6 0 3 2 0 0 
6 Economic advantages of tax flight 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 
7 Flight abroad 2 2 13 1 0 11 1 0 13 0 0 1 
8 Injustice 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 
9 Vertical justice 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
10 Horizontal justice 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
11 Cleverness 2 0 0 3 2 1 5 1 0 0 2 0 
12 Audit and sanction 0 8 1 0 12 0 0 3 2 0 5 0 
13 Individual justification 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 
14 Personal advantage 1 2 1 4 1 3 5 5 4 2 2 6 
15 Illegal 1 7 0 0 10 0 2 5 0 1 2 0 
16 Peccadillo 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 2 0 
17 Negative consequences of tax flight 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 
18 Economic consequences 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 
19 Tax types 0 2 2 1 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 
20 Harmonization of the tax system 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
21 Bureaucracy 0 0 2 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 
22 Criticism on the tax system 0 0 1 3 1 4 0 2 1 0 0 1 
23 Unprofitable 0 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 2 
24 Unacceptance of tax reduction 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 9 3 0 4 1 
25 Opportunity 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
26 Make use of tax allowances 6 1 1 3 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 
27 Wish to reduce the tax burden 1 0 5 0 3 3 1 1 4 0 0 1 
28 Risk tendency 1 3 2 1 12 0 3 4 1 0 6 1 
29 Tax loophole 8 0 0 5 0 1 5 1 0 5 0 0 
30 Acceptance of tax reduction 4 1 4 8 3 2 8 0 1 6 3 1 
31 Black money 0 1 0 0 8 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 
32 Reactance 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
33 Tax law 2 2 5 4 2 6 1 0 4 0 0 0 
34 Tax office 0 6 4 4 6 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
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Multiple-choice test on tax knowledge (correct answers are indicated in italics). 
1. Austria’s top marginal income tax-rate is? (32%; 42%; 50%; 60%) 
2. For which of the following expenditures there is no tax allowance? (third party insurance; 
insurance premium for retirement; payments for tax consultants; payments for officially 
registered religious bodies) 
3. Which tax had to be harmonized after Austria joined the European Union? (local taxes; 
value-added tax; income tax; capital yields tax) 
4. How does the sales tax differ from value-added tax in Austria? (the sales tax is 10%, 
whereas the value-added tax is 20%; the sales tax is 20%, whereas the value-added tax is 
10%; both taxes are synonyms; sales tax refers to entrepreneurs, whereas value-added tax 
refers to consumers) 
5. The corporate income tax in Austria is? (25%; 34%; 48%; 60%) 
6. Which of the following positions is not an essential part of a receipt? (time; date; amount; 
value-added tax) 
7. What exception allows a financial year to be shorter than twelve months? (a company is 
being set up or shut down; tax authorities gain more insight in companies’ affairs; a 
shorter financial year is not allowed; a shorter financial year can be chosen individually) 
8. Which of the following legal forms belongs to legal entities? (ordinary partnerships; sole 
proprietors; corporations; limited partnerships) 
9. When is income tax not applicable? (when the income is illegal; when the income is not 
listed in the codified law; when the income has already been subject to another tax; there 
is no reason that income tax is not applicable)  
10. Financial asset gains that belong to companies’ fixed assets of a limited are part of which 
income source? (business income; self-employed income; income from capital gains; 
other income) 
 
 
 
